Abstract Since China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the pressure for bank reforms has mounted as China ought to have fully opened up its financial market to foreign competition by 2006. Efficiency is key for domestic banks to survive in a liberalised environment, but it appears that the last hope for raising bank efficiency is through ownership reform. Whether ownership reform and foreign competition can solve China's banking problem remains to be tested. This paper aims to answer this question using a non-parametric approach to analyse the efficiency changes of 15 large commercial banks during 1998-2005. We find that ownership reform and foreign competition have forced Chinese commercial banks to improve performance, as their total factor productivity rose by 5.6 per cent per annum. This coincides with the recent bullish Chinese stock markets led by three listed state-owned commercial banks. Despite such encouraging results, we remain cautious about the future of Chinese banks, as the good results may have been artificially created with massive government support and the fundamentals of the banks may be still weak.
INTRODUCTION
S TATE-OWNED commercial banks in China have been renowned for their low efficiency, mounting non-performing loans (NPLs) and loss making. China's bank reforms have lagged far behind reforms in other economic sectors for two reasons. First, the banking industry has been overwhelmingly dominated by state ownership and enjoyed immense monopolistic power. Second, state commercial banks have enjoyed a significant leverage of soft budget constraint because they are frequently entrusted or coerced by local authorities to provide policy lending, or to help rescue insolvent state-owned industrial enterprises.
Aggressive banking reforms started from the late 1980s, initially to separate policy lending from commercial operations by establishing three state policy banks and then stripping off the NPLs from the largest state-owned commercial banks, including Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) (hereafter, the 'Big Four'), using four newly created state asset management companies. The latest reforms since China joined the WTO in December 2001 have been the result of both internal and external pressures. Internal pressure arises because of fierce competition from regional and private banking institutions, while external pressure comes from the free entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market.
But how have state commercial banks reacted to these new pressures for reform? Answering this question requires a comprehensive analysis of the change in efficiency and productivity of these banks in recent years. There are potentially many ways to evaluate bank efficiency. The two most frequently used methodologies are the stochastic production function approach and the data envelopment analysis, or DEA, approach. As the former requires a specific functional form, it may not be suitable for the data period when the banking industry in China has undergone dramatic changes. Hence, we use the latter approach which is not subject to such problems. This paper is probably the first attempt in the literature to evaluate the technical efficiency of Chinese commercial banks using DEA to analyse the efficiency levels of these banks over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , which covers both the pre-WTO era and the first few years of the post-WTO era in China. In addition, a Malmquist index is calculated and decomposed to evaluate how Chinese commercial banks have improved their productivity through reform and adoption of new technologies in order to face up to the immense competition ahead of them by 2006, the last year when China had to fully open up its financial market to foreign banks. This paper will focus on the efficiency issue in order to evaluate whether Chinese state commercial banks have reacted positively and successfully to the new reforms and challenges. It uses data from all national commercial banks, state-and non-state-owned, domestic and foreign-invested, over the period 1998 -2005 . It employs the DEA approach to measure the efficiency scores of banks and then conducts a Malmquist index analysis to study the evolution of productivity changes. The DEA results show that the Big Four are not necessarily less efficient than their joint equity counterparts. In fact, two state-owned banks, CCB and BOC, continuously outperform their state-owned peers and most joint equity banks.
1 However, joint equity banks have a significant advantage over stateowned banks in terms of asset quality. The Malmquist index analysis indicates that the average productivity of all Chinese banks rose 5.6 per cent per annum over the data period. The productivity growth was almost equally explained by efficiency improvement and technological progress. Much of the productivity growth of the state-owned commercial banks was the result of efficiency improvement and little down to technological progress. In contrast, much of the productivity growth of the joint equity commercial banks was the result of technological progress and little down to efficiency improvement. Such empirical results have interesting and important policy implications because they imply that government policies should be designed differently to improve the performance of different banks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the reform and current structure of China's banking industry. Section 3 reviews the recent efficiency studies in the banking sector and introduces the DEA methodology. Section 4 evaluates the efficiency of 15 Chinese national commercial banks and to strip off NPLs from the Big Four and inject new capital. The first wave was in 1999 when four state asset management companies were set up to accommodate 1.4 trillion RMB of NPLs, equivalent to almost 20 per cent of China's GDP in the same year. The second wave of support came in 2003 and 2004, when 475.6 billion RMB of NPLs were stripped off from CCB and BOC. In the meantime, the government provided US$22.5 billion, taken from the country's huge foreign exchange reserves, to support these two banks. The final wave of support was in 2005, when 705 billion RMB of NPLs was stripped off from ICBC, with an additional capital injection of US$15 billion and the issuance of US$12.1 billion in subordinated debt (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2006) .
The purpose of state support was to make the initial public offerings (IPOs) of CCB, BOC and ICBC attractive to investors. In the meantime, the Big Four introduced a strict monitoring mechanism to control NPLs and reduced their workforce by 250,000 ( The Economist , 2006) . The first bank of the Big Four to be listed was CCB, whose IPO in Hong Kong in October 2005 raised US$8 billion. It was followed by BOC, which was listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in May 2006, raising US$11.2 billion. The IPO of ICBC in October 2006 in Hong Kong and Shanghai raised US$21.9 billion, setting a new world record, surpassing the IPO record set by Japan's NTT Mobile Communications Network Inc., which raised US$18.4 billion in 1998 (Mitchell, 2006) . The extraordinary performance of the Chinese stock markets in 2006 and 2007 has produced many world-class companies in terms of market value. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Index increased six-fold in two years, as did the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Index. As a result, the three listed state-owned commercial banks, ICBC, BOC and CCB, are now among the top 10 largest banks in the world in terms of market value.
Although China's banking sector was opened to foreign banks in 1981, foreign participation was extremely restricted until December 2001 when China joined the WTO. Since 2001, the restriction has gradually been relaxed, allowing full CBRC (2006) , the development of foreign banks in China has three features: radiating outwards from concentration in the Yangtze, Pearl and Bohai Rim economic circles; expanding rapidly, with market share increasing; and providing more than 100 kinds of business services in 12 business categories. The most active foreign bank in China is HSBC, which has significant investments in the CBC (US$1.75 billion, or 19.9 per cent of the total equity) and some regional city commercial banks. The Royal Bank of Scotland has bought 4.37 per cent of the total share equity of BOC. Most other foreign investors, including the Asian Development Bank, International Financial Corporation, CitiBank, Hang Seng Bank, Newbridge Asia and Commonwealth Bank of Australia have focused their investments in the regional city commercial banks.
Ownership reform and foreign investments have provided significant impetus for the Chinese domestic commercial banks to improve their performance through restructuring, strict control and monitoring of lending activities and the reform of corporate governance. By 2006, foreign banks and their subsidiaries had no business or geographical restriction to serve Chinese customers. It is urgent for domestic commercial banks to improve efficiency to survive in a more competitive market.
BANKING EFFICIENCY LITERATURE AND DEA METHODOLOGY
Over the past two decades, numerous studies have focused on measuring the efficiency of commercial banks. Berger and Humphrey (1997) document 130 studies on financial institutions' efficiency, using data from 21 countries, from various types of institutions including banks, bank branches, savings and loan institutions, credit unions and insurance companies. Richard et al. (2002) use a constrained multiplier, input-oriented, DEA model to evaluate the production efficiency of US commercial banks during 1984 -98. They found a strong and consistent relationship between efficiency and independent measures of performance. Pastor (1999) proposes a new sequential DEA procedure for Spanish banks to break down the main indicator of banking risk provision for loan losses into internal and external components. Girardone et al. (2004) investigate the main determinants of Italian banks' cost efficiency over the period 1993-96. They find that X-inefficiencies tend to decline over time for all bank sizes. The inclusion of risk and output quality variables in the cost function reduces the significance of the scale economy estimates.
The efficiency of banks in Taiwan and Hong Kong has also attracted much academic interest. Chen and Yeh (2000) adopt the intermediation approach in the DEA model where deposits are treated as an input since a bank's main business is to borrow funds from depositors in order to lend to others. The approach specifies three outputs: the provision of loan services, portfolio investment and non-interest income; and three inputs: bank staff, assets and deposits. They also note that the increase in staff salaries and market competition may make it difficult to improve technical efficiency. Drake et al. (2003) use Hong Kong banking data to examine the macroeconomic and regulatory factors that influence bank efficiency. In the Tobit regression, external factors such as GDP and government expenditures are tested instead of firm characteristics.
Few studies have been found to address the efficiency issues of China's banking industry in the English language. Fu and Heffernan (2005) measure concentration, market share, X-efficiency and scale efficiency of Chinese banks to test both the market power and the efficient structure hypotheses. Their results show that during the first phase of reform, large state banks exercising market power as major loan providers were subsidised by the government. During the second phase of reform, state bank subsidies were cut, allowing the relatively more X-efficient joint-stock banks to earn higher profits, although they were less scale efficient. Chen et al. (2005) examine the cost, technical and allocative efficiency of 43 Chinese banks during 1993-2000. The results show that large state-owned banks and small banks are more efficient than medium-sized banks. The financial deregulation in 1995 was found to have improved both technical and allocative efficiency. There is also evidence of continuous dominance of technical efficiency over allocative efficiency, implying that Chinese banks need to improve their ability to minimise costs through input combinations. Yao et al. (2007) employ a stochastic production frontier function to investigate the effects of ownership structure and hard budget constraint on technical efficiency of Chinese domestic banks. They find that non-state banks are 8 to 18 per cent more efficient than state banks, and banks facing a harder budget tend to perform better than those heavily capitalised by the state or regional governments.
Technical efficiency is measuring how well inputs are converted into outputs during a specific production process. It is stated as 'the ratio of weighted sum of outputs to weighted sum of inputs'. DEA was originally developed for efficiency measurement in an input-output setting based on the concept of Pareto optimum (Charnes et al., 1978) . What is produced is an 'efficiency frontier' made up of those DMUs (decision-making units) that are efficient relative to the other units under evaluation. The frontier consists of the 'best' units in the evaluation set and represents a linear combination of empirically derived maximum output per given input. Each DMU is assigned an efficiency rating based on its position relative to the frontier. The efficient units, those making best use of resources, are rated as being 100 per cent efficient, whilst the inefficient ones obtain lower scores. This paper uses a production boundary-based linear programming model which is referred to as the envelopment model. Mathematical proof of the equivalence of efficiency rating to the Pareto-efficiency concept can be found in Thanassoulis (2001) . The technical input efficiency of DMU k (decision-making unit k , or bank k in our case) is a solution to the following problem: (1) subject to
where x ik and y jk denote the level of the i th input and j th output observed at DMU k . Any feasible set of λ values in model 1 identifies a point within the production possibility set which can be constructed from DMU k ( k = 1, 2, . . . , n ). S − is defined as the input excesses and S + the output excesses. ε is a non-Archimedean infinitesimal. DMU k is technically efficient if and only if
The envelopment model is a straightforward linear programming and λ values provide information about efficient peers in the reference sets.
In this paper, we will measure three types of efficiency scores: constant returns to scale (CRS), variable returns to scale (VRS) and scale efficiency. The CRS efficiency score draws from the assumption of constant returns to scale and represents technical efficiency which measures inefficiencies due to the inputoutput configuration as well as the size of operation. The VRS efficiency score is based on the assumption of variable returns to scale and represents pure technical efficiency. Scale efficiency can be calculated by dividing pure technical efficiency into technical efficiency. To assess the input efficiency under VRS, we can still use model (1) but include only the so-called convexity constraint In the following section, we first use a CRS input-oriented envelopment model to assess the technical efficiency of Chinese national commercial banks and then construct an output-oriented Malmquist index to examine the productivity growth in China's banking industry.
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS

a. Efficiency Scores and Ranks
Interest income and non-interest income have been widely recognised as outputs of commercial banks. However, there is a debate about whether deposits should be treated as an input or output. We do not agree that banks use deposits to produce loans. Deposits are an intermediate substance which helps banks achieve interest income and non-interest income through banking services. The input is not the deposit itself but the resources that are used to generate the deposit, e.g. the interest expenses and labour cost. As such, the inputs should contain interest expenses and non-interest expenses such as salary cost. During the process of transferring deposits to loans, banks will inevitably incur some impaired loans. Banking in this sense is a sort of risk business. Impaired loans are a cost that banks have to bear and can be dealt with as a resource to gain interest yields from gross loans. The ratio of impaired loans, or non-performing loans, to gross loans is included in this study as the third input variable, taking the asset quality into account. Obviously, given the output levels, the lower the ratio, the higher the efficiency of the banks. Table 1 describes the input and output levels of the 15 largest Chinese national commercial banks in 2005. The data for efficiency analysis consist of all 15 banks over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The data are extracted from Bankscope. The first column lists the banks' abbreviated name (the full names are given in the Appendix), followed by columns containing information about interest incomes, interest expenses, non-interest incomes, non-interest expenses and the ratio of NPLs to gross loans for each bank. Only the Big Four achieve interest incomes greater than 100 billion RMB. In terms of interest incomes, the biggest state bank is ICBC while the biggest joint equity bank is CBC. The interest income gap between them is 174.5 billion RMB. However, when interest expenses are considered, the Big Four do not seem to perform much better than joint equity banks. CCB has the highest ratio at 3.04 of interest incomes to interest expenses and Zhu (2003) . The average efficiency score of Chinese state-owned commercial banks over the data period is 0.85. It demonstrates that many banks are producing close to the frontier, which is led by BOC and CCB. In other words, the efficiency levels of the sample banks are very close to each other. There are two possible explanations for the results. First, the data include only the national banks which have similar characteristics in terms of inputs and outputs. Second, in the data period, the banking system was highly competitive as inefficient banks have to emulate efficient banks quickly in order to avoid being taken over or forced out of business. For whatever reason, the relatively high level of average efficiency scores implies that Chinese banks were trying to improve their competitiveness both before and after WTO accession. This is reflected by the small but obvious improvement in the average efficiency scores over the data period. The industrial average efficiency scores rose from 0.78 in 1999 to 0.91 by 2005. Three banks, CCB, BOC and CBC, are identified as the most technically efficient as their average efficiency scores are equal or close to unity. Of the Big Four, CCB, BOC and ICBC are among the most efficient banks but ABC is the second most inefficient in the sample. This explains why the government has allowed the former three to be listed on the stock markets but kept ABC in its present form. The finding that CCB, BOC and ICBC are among the most efficient commercial banks in China contradicts a common perception and the results of some previous studies. The relative understatement of the state-owned commercial banks in China by some other studies may have been due to their modelling method. If deposit is included as an input, the stock of deposits in the Big Four is much bigger than those in the joint equity banks, leading to a low efficiency rating of the Big Four. However, the expenses of maintaining the deposits by the Big Four are low. If deposit is excluded from the model, as has been done in this paper, the efficiency rating of the Big Four is improved.
The most inefficient joint equity bank is GDB, justifying why the government has been negotiating with Citigroup and Société Générale to buy 85 per cent of GDB's share capital. China has been reluctant to allow any foreign bank to have a controlling stake in any Chinese bank. However, there are exceptional cases if foreign participation can fundamentally transform the performance of a local bank and provide valuable experiences for the reforms of others by introducing the best foreign managerial practices and corporate governance. One such exceptional case was the San Francisco-based capital fund Newbridge, which was allowed to become the largest and controlling shareholder of SDB through the procurement of a 17.8 per cent stake worth US$145 million from its four government shareholders in May 2004 (Dong, 2005) .
b. Slacks and Targets
As for input efficiency, an efficiency score equal to one means that efficient banks lie on the boundary and their input levels cannot be radically reduced for a given output level. DEA results not only help managers to identify best practice in the sector, but also point to the direction and magnitude that inefficient banks can improve. In 2005, for example, CEB had an efficiency score of 0.79, which means that the maximum radial contraction (0.21) is possible to the input level without reducing its output. According to the DEA model, the input and output slacks must be taken into account. As a result, the target for efficiency improvement will be the sum of radial reduction and the existing slack. Taking CEB as an example, the target ratio of NPLs/gross loans will be (0.05 * 0.79) − 0.028 = 0.011.
After knowing the efficiency improvement targets, inefficient banks need to find out the most feasible way to catch up. It is crucial that the process of efficiency improvement should be made in a short time period. Efficiency theory suggests that it is always good to learn from the efficient peers with the same or similar input-output mix. The reference set offers inefficient banks a feasible means to emulate their efficient peers by learning from their practice.
Taking CEB in 2005 as an example, CMB and PDB are identified as its efficient peers in the reference set as their corresponding λ = 0.296 and λ = 0.498 are the only positive values at the optimal solution to the envelopment model. Compared with CEB, PDB has fewer non-interest expenses and a lower NPL/ gross loan ratio but more interest and non-interest incomes. Although PDB has 3 per cent more interest expenses than CEB, the former earns 17.5 per cent more interest incomes than the latter. If we scale down PDB and CMB by 0.498 and 0.296 respectively, the combination of scaled-down input levels of PDB and CMB offers the same interest income as CEB could deliver but it uses only 87 per cent of the inputs used by CEB. This underlies the Pareto-efficiency rating of CEB at 0.87. PDB and CMB are thus regarded as the efficient benchmarks for CEB in 2005. It requires high managerial skills within inefficient banks to study their efficient peers' practices and set up targets in relation to the combination of input and output levels of their efficient benchmarks.
Among state banks, CCB and BOC are most frequently referenced. Another efficient state bank, ICBC, has never been referenced. In this sense, CCB and BOC should be regarded as the efficient benchmarks for the inefficient state bank ABC. The empirical results provide a strong theoretical backing for the government's decision on the order of priority of restructuring CCB, BOC and ICBC. PDB and BOS are often quoted in the reference sets of joint equity banks, although their average efficiency scores are not the highest among joint equity banks. One possible explanation for their frequent appearance in the reference sets is that their operating practices and environment match more closely with the less efficient joint equity banks than the other more efficient counterparts.
c. Scale Type and Scale Efficiency
In theory, an efficient bank must produce at constant returns to scale. At an IRS (increasing returns to scale) production point, the firm raising its input levels by a small percentage will lead to an expansion of its output by a higher percentage. At a DRS (decreasing returns to scale) production point, a small expansion of output requires a larger percentage increase in inputs. Obviously, when IRS holds, a bank should increase its scale size. Similarly, when DRS holds, a bank should reduce its operation. The ideal scale size is where CRS holds.
It is striking to note that inefficient state banks in most years exhibit DRS while inefficient joint equity banks show IRS. The empirical results provide valuable information for policy makers to justify their capital injection initiatives and business expansion regulations. It is interesting to deduce that the reason why non-state ownership in joint equity banks has not brought about superior performance over their state-owned and bigger counterparts is clearly due to the lack of scale economies. Improving the overall performance of the Chinese banking industry will require not only ownership reform but also a consolidation of operations to exploit the economies of scale in the non-state sector.
By controlling for the scale effect, joint equity banks become relatively more efficient than their state-owned counterparts. In particular, CMB, HXB and BOS improve their efficiency and ranking dramatically, implying that joint equity banks should be encouraged to expand their branch networks in order to improve their competitiveness and overall efficiency of the entire banking industry in China. Scale inefficiency is the biggest source of the overall technical inefficiency of joint equity banks. 
d. Correlation between Firm Size, Efficiency Ranking and Profitability Ranking
It is interesting to investigate the relationship between efficiency and profitability rankings of commercial banks. Studies, such as that by Berger and Mester (1997) , find that firm size is a possible factor that influences efficiency and profitability of commercial banks. The profitability in this study is measured as the ratio of pre-tax profit over total assets.
The results show that there is no evidence of any strong correlation between the rankings of efficiency scores, profitability and firm size, implying that firm size is not an important factor for efficiency and profitability. Because profitability is measured as the ratio of pre-tax profit over total assets, it effectively measures the accumulated historical performance of banks, instead of their current operating performance. In this sense, a DEA efficiency score is a better measurement of firm performance than profitability.
There is also no evidence that joint equity banks outperform state-owned banks. CCB and BOC enjoy high rankings based on both efficiency and profitability indices. Similar results are obtained in other years. Our finding is in accordance with the conclusions reached in recent research by Bonin et al. (2005) but contradicts some other studies that are based on a different research methodology (Yao et al., 2007) . With respect to the impact of ownership, privatisation or a joint equity arrangement is not a sufficient condition to increase a bank's efficiency, as state-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than private or joint equity banks as far as our sample is concerned. However, it is found that efficient commercial banks, whether they are state-owned or of joint equity, happened to be those that have been listed recently on the stock markets, while the inefficient banks have not been allowed to be listed. The Malmquist index has frequently been used to measure productivity changes in various industries. The advantage of the Malmquist index as opposed to other alternative measurements is that productivity change can be decomposed into efficiency improvement and technological progress. The first empirical study relating to the Malmquist index in a DEA context is Färe et al. (1989) . The Malmquist index captures productivity change in terms of quantities without reference to input prices or output values. As the Malmquist index is always computed maintaining a constant returns to scale assumption, its value is the same whether it is computed in an input or output orientation (Thanassoulis, 2001) . Hence, the output orientation efficiency scores are used to conduct the Malmquist index to fit the interpretation of productivity change. 4 The Malmquist index and its decomposition can be calculated on an annual basis for individual banks or for a given data period. To save space, the detailed calculations on an annual or periodic basis are not presented here. Table 3 presents only the geometric average annual growth rates of total factor productivity, measured by the Malmquist index in column 2, the geometric average annual growth rates of technical efficiency in column 3, and the geometric average annual growth rates of technological progress in column 4.
Except for CITIC, CEB and SDB, all the banks achieved significant total factor productivity growth over the data period. The star performer is CCB, which becomes a benchmark for other state banks. Over the data period, CCB achieves an average annual growth of more than 15 per cent in total factor productivity. Among the joint equity banks, CBC, CMB and PDB outperform their peers. They achieve an annual productivity growth of 7.5 per cent or more. In contrast, CITIC, CEB and SDB experience serious deterioration in their productivity, with a negative growth rate of nearly 4 per cent per annum.
On average, Chinese national commercial banks achieved remarkable growth in total factor productivity. The average growth is 5.6 per cent per annum pulling 15 banks together over the entire data period. The average growth rate after China's accession to the WTO in 2001 was more than 10 per cent per year, much higher than the average growth prior to WTO accession. This implies that WTO accession has been a powerful impetus for reforms in China to improve bank efficiency.
The Malmquist index can be decomposed into efficiency changes and technological progress, or frontier shift. As shown in column 3 of Table 3 , the average industrial technical efficiency change is 2.88 per cent per annum, which accounts for more than half the total factor productivity growth. CCB and BOC are the best performers in terms of efficiency growth, as both achieve double-digit annual growth in the data period. The contribution of technological progress to total factor productivity is presented in the last column in Table 3 . The average annual growth is 2.64 per cent for all the banks over the whole data period. It is striking to find that all the banks achieve positive technological growth, and the best performers are not the Big Four state-owned banks but the joint equity banks, such as HXB, BOS, PDB and CEB.
The decomposition results in Table 3 have important policy implications. First, the Chinese banking industry has become considerably more competitive in recent years, especially after WTO accession, although state-owned banks still enjoy some encapsulated market power, as well as government protection and financial support. Second, the growth of total factor productivity is almost equally explained by its two components: efficiency improvement and technological progress. Third, large state-owned banks make more progress in improving their technical efficiency than their joint equity counterparts, but the latter achieve more technological progress than the former. Possible explanations for the significant improvement in total factor productivity growth, especially for CCB and BOC, are their efforts to retrench employment, to implement a stricter monitoring and control mechanism on lending and to improve management and corporate governance. 
CONCLUSION
This paper uses the latest banking data to assess the efficiency of Chinese national commercial banks. It is the first attempt to use the resource approach to identify inputs and outputs in the banking context with reference to asset quality. One key finding is that Chinese national commercial banks do not have substantial differences in technical efficiencies as the average efficiency scores are high and the aggregate gaps in technical efficiency are low at only 15 per cent. Another important finding is that the total factor productivity of the sample banks rose significantly by 5.6 per cent per annum over the data period. These empirical results show clear evidence that Chinese national commercial banks have reacted positively and aggressively to ownership reform and foreign competition.
Three large state-owned banks, CCB, BOC and ICBC, dominate the market as they have high technical efficiency and profitability, explaining why their IPOs in 2005 and 2006 were so heavily demanded by investors. Despite the improvement in efficiency, productivity and the success of transformation into shareholding companies, it has to be pointed out that the results of bank reform in China in the last few years may have been created artificially, or at least supported, by the government. On the other hand, the empirical results in this paper provide some useful additional insights into the Chinese commercial banking industry. They contradict a perceived conception that Chinese state-owned banks cannot withstand the onslaught of foreign banks entering into China after WTO accession. The successful IPOs of CCB, BOC and ICBC indicate that the government has achieved its first goal of ownership reform with foreign competition after WTO accession, which is to transfer the Big Four from state-owned banks into shareholding companies. Anecdotal evidence and observation over the past two years show that Chinese commercial banks have made significant progress in improving their efficiency and corporate governance. Apart from reducing the number of employees, the Big Four have improved their lending strategies and tried to steer away from intervention by local governments. Some commercial banks have tried to form strategic alliances with foreign commercial banks by allowing their investments in an effort to learn from their advanced managerial and organisational experiences. This paper shows some strong and unambiguous results that CCB and BOC have emerged to be China's best performing commercial banks, even better than many of the joint equity banks. Although it is too early to predict whether the Big Four will compete successfully with foreign banks and establish themselves as world-class commercial financial institutions, the fact that the Chinese commercial banks in general, and the CCB, BOC and ICBC in particular, have achieved admirable productivity growth implies that the most recent banking reforms in China have produced some encouraging results.
The empirical results in this paper also indicate that the Big Four, except for ABC, were able to improve total factor productivity mainly through improving technical efficiency, instead of technological progress. In contrast, the joint equity banks have improved their productivity mainly through technological progress rather than efficiency improvement. In addition, they appear to have suffered from the lack of scale economies because they do not have a large network of branches as do their larger state-owned counterparts. In other words, joint equity banks have not been able to exploit their ownership advantage over the Big Four because they are not big enough. Joint equity banks were initially established by regional governments with the clear objective of serving the local market. Although they have expanded their services throughout the country, they are still locally controlled and do not have the ability to become truly national, let alone international, through exploiting the economies of scale and scope.
Future bank reforms in China may go in the following directions. First, the Big Four should change their ownership structure to become truly large commercial banks with minimum intervention from central and regional governments. Bank directors should be appointed based on professional qualifications and managerial ability instead of party seniority. Second, the same reforms in the state sector should also be applied in the joint equity sector, but mergers and acquisitions should be encouraged to enable them to exploit the economies of scale and scope.
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